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We present an optical method of storing random cryptographic keys, at high densities, within an
electronically reconfigurable volume of polymer-dispersed liquid crystal (PDLC) film. We demon-
strate how temporary application of a voltage above PDLC’s saturation threshold can completely
randomize (i.e., decorrelate) its optical scattering potential in less than a second. A unique optical
setup is built around this resettable PDLC film to non-electronically save many random cryp-
tographic bits, with minimal error, over a period of one day. These random bits, stored at an
unprecedented density (10 Gb/mm3), can then be erased and transformed into a new random key
space in less than one second. Cryptographic applications of such a volumetric memory device in-
clude use as a crypto-currency wallet and as a source of resettable “fingerprints” for time-sensitive
authentication. (*)Authors contributed equally to this work.
A common problem facing all cryptographic systems is
how to secure their secret keys from malicious attack. An
effective key storage medium should be both challenging
for someone to copy or tamper with, as well as quickly
erasable (i.e., easily destroyed when circumstances re-
quire). Many cryptosystems, both historic and current,
fail to achieve these two properties simultaneously. For
example, the Enigma machine was complex enough to
prevent duplication for several years during WWII, but
could not be easily destroyed. At the same time, it was
common to distribute one-time cipher pads printed on
flammable paper. The pads could be quickly burned,
but were easily copied and distributed when recovered
by an enemy.
Today, digital electronic memory stores nearly all of
our cryptographic random keys. Unfortunately, digital
storage neither prevents copying nor is easily erasable,
even if designed towards such ends. Many cryptographic
systems store random keys in non-volatile memory (e.g.,
EEPROMs), for which several well-known invasive at-
tacks exist [1]. Semi-invasive attacks have also copied
the sensitive bits stored in volatile forms of memory, like
SRAM [2] and DRAM [4]. Even systems designed to
ensure that sensitive information disappears from tran-
sient memory when powered off have been easily cir-
cumvented [3, 4]. Apart from external attack, an ad-
versary may internally embed untrustworthy pseudoran-
dom number generation software [5] or electronic hard-
ware [6, 7] without revealing any breach of security to
the user.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are a recently
proposed class of storage device that attempt to increase
the difficulty of copying, modeling or probing the con-
tents of digital electronic memory [8]. They use the inher-
ent microscopic physical disorder within a device, often
in the form of variations induced during fabrication, to
form a unique “fingerprint” that is extremely challeng-
ing to copy or model. Examples include timing offsets
in integrated circuits [9], instabilities in volatile mem-
ory cells [10], capacitances of perturbed films [11], and
scattering potentials of volumetric materials [8]. Ran-
dom keys are typically derived from these physical finger-
prints after additional digital processing. Most PUFs to
date remain electronic-based, which unfortunately have
a very low key storage density (at most several kilobits
per square millimeter) and are challenging to fully recon-
figure into a new random state.
Reconfigurability in modern systems is a desirable
property not just for preventing use in the case of device
theft. It can also increase the strength of various commu-
nication protocols by limiting the amount of encrypted
data available for cryptanalysis (i.e., by periodically ro-
tating keys). By ensuring keys disappear in an unrecover-
able manner, reconfigurability also enables time-sensitive
protocols, e.g. to assist with digital copyright manage-
ment or to limit building access. Several initial reconfig-
urable electronic PUF demonstrations have shown lim-
ited success [12–14], but still do not approach sufficient
key-bit densities for many applications of interest. Fur-
thermore, investigations have scrutinized [15] and proven
incorrect [16] “unclonability” claims for electronic PUFs
- their two-dimensional surfaces still expose sensitive con-
tent to direct measurement or malicious alteration.
Here, we present a reconfigurable optical scattering-
based storage (ROSS) mechanism whose volumetric
structure is both “strongly unclonable” (as defined
in [15]) and can have its contents quickly erased. To
read a fixed number of random bits, we probe a disor-
dered volume of particles with an input coherent optical
field (Fig. 1). The distributed particles will scatter light
into a unique speckle interference pattern, which a digi-
tal detector measures to form into a randomized output.
This random output “key” depends both upon the unique
distribution of particles within the scattering volume as
well as the shape of the input coherent light field. We can
sequentially perturb the input light field’s phase using a
spatial light modulator (SLM) to output a large num-
ber of independent speckle patterns. The large space of
possible optical scattering interactions within the particle
volume ensures the set of output speckle patterns is effec-
tively uncorrelated, leading to a large set of statistically
random keys. The volumetric nature of the scattering
structure facilitates very high random bit storage den-
sities: 1 Tb/mm3 predicted in theory, and 10 Gb/mm3
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
24
19
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.op
tic
s] 
 10
 M
ar 
20
14
2PDLC film CMOS sensor Coherent light 
(V, t) 
(a) V = 0 (b) Reconfigure: V > Vsat (c) V = 0 
E +	  -­‐	  
s(x,y) 
polymer 
LC droplet 
FIG. 1. The optical scattering response of PDLC film may
be reconfigured with temporary application of a large voltage,
which introduces mobile ions (red) into the material.
thus far demonstrated in experiment [21].
As first analyzed in [8], the volumetric nature of scat-
tering storage ensures copying, modeling or fully mea-
suring the scattering response of many distributed meso-
scopic particles remains a significant challenge. The un-
clonable security of a stolen ROSS device is limited by the
time it would take an attacker to model its complete scat-
tering response, equivalent to characterizing the scatter-
ing volume’s optical scattering transmission matrix [23].
Several techniques enable such an attack [22] but take
upwards of several days per device [21]. A scattering
medium with a variable scattering transmission matrix,
such as PDLC, may allow a PUF device to periodically
reset its stored randomness to extend its effective secu-
rity lifetime beyond several days. Following, we first ex-
perimentally demonstrate how the scattering response of
PDLC may be reset, and then use it to construct a device
that achieves both our desired security goals of tamper-
resistance and erasability, simultaneously.
PDLC is a well-studied material whose optical trans-
mission properties change with the introduction of a volt-
age across the film interface. The films employed in
this study exhibit a 400 µm-think optically transpar-
ent polymer substrate containing a 20 µm-thick active
layer of sub-micron sized liquid crystal (LC) droplets
distributed throughout, sandwiched between a transpar-
ent anode and cathode. In the off state (no voltage),
the birefringent LC molecules randomly align themselves
between various dislocations (i.e., anchor points) along
each droplet’s surface (Fig. 1(a)). The boundary of
each droplet thus exhibits a random index of refraction
mismatch, causing an incident optical field to scatter
within the film. The optical response of such a mate-
rial dense with wavelength-scale particles may be conve-
niently characterized by a scattering matrix containing
complex random Gaussian entries, T [23]. In the “on”
state (V ≈ 2-3V/µm), the LC’s orient themselves along
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FIG. 2. Reconfiguring PDLC with an applied voltage. (a) The
optical scattering response of PDLC decorrelates to different
values as a function of DC voltage V and application time
t. (b) Cross-correlation C of different speckle images after
repeated application of fixed voltage V = 40 V for duration
t = 1 sec. shows continued film decorrelation.
the voltage gradient, aligning the dielectric tensor of all
droplets (Fig. 1(b)). The film thus becomes nearly trans-
parent, changing T into an optical transformation that
closely resembles the identity matrix.
When the direct current (DC) voltage V used to keep
PDLC in an on-state is above a certain critical saturation
value Vsat, its LC molecules undergo an electrochemical
reaction [17]. This DC-induced reaction effects both the
LCs within each droplet [18] as well as the liquid-polymer
and polymer-electrode boundaries, where charge instabil-
ities build up. Specifically, [19] has shown that the pro-
longed DC applied to an LC cell introduces mobile ions
that selectively adsorb at droplet boundaries. Likewise,
[20] has derived how free ions at a substrate-LC boundary
can shift the LC’s anchoring energy, thus rotating its lo-
cal dielectric tensor. We hypothesize that a combination
of the above electrochemical effects cause PDLC film’s
scattering response to shift after a large DC voltage is
applied. Mathematically, we can describe this scattering
response shift as a change in a PDLC film’s original off-
state random scattering matrix T into a new and unpre-
dictable off-state matrix T ′. As we demonstrate next, the
transformation of T into T ′ effectively “resets” the space
of randomness from which we can derive cryptographic
keys. This process cannot be reversed, which gives us our
second desired security property of erasability discussed
above.
To demonstrate the reconfigurability of PDLC’s scat-
tering response, we first illuminate a film with a coherent
plane wave of 532 nm light and measure its optical re-
sponse, s0(x, y), which is the intensity of the speckle field
at the digital detector’s (Micron CMOS MT9P031) dis-
cretized spatial coordinates (x, y) (Fig. 1). Then, we
apply a DC voltage V > Vsat for a fixed time t across
the film surface, during which the film becomes optically
transparent. After removing the voltage, we measure a
new optical scattering response, st(x, y) which is signif-
icantly different from the original measurement s0. We
compare s0 and st with a cross-correlation. Perform-
ing this experiment for many different values of V and t
yields the correlation data in Fig. 2(a), indicating that a
40 V potential applied for several seconds decorrelates the
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FIG. 3. The schematic of the ROSS device, where an SLM
is used to probe the PDLC material in Fig. 1. Many un-
correlated speckle images s may be detected as many unique
binary patterns p are cycled through on the SLM, from which
our total key set K is derived.
film’s scattering response to a minimal value (a new film
was used for each measurement to remove any bias). To
demonstrate the induced potential continues to produce
a random optical response within one film, we repeat this
experiment 50 times with the same film fixing V = 40V
and t = 1 second. All images are significantly (yet not
fully) uncorrelated, showing the scattering state does not
momentarily leave and return to an original configura-
tion or approach a steady-state molecular configuration,
but continues to vary in a semi-random fashion. Im-
proved decorrelation may be achieved by increasing the
thickness of the active PDLC material, stacking multiple
films along the optical axis, or executing multiple reset
operations sequentially over time.
The PDLC volume’s random distribution of sub-
micron droplets will serve as our ROSS device’s random
bit “database”. Due to its volumetric structure, physi-
cally probing, altering or copying its contexts remains a
significant challenge. To selectively address a subset of its
stored randomness, we place an SLM (1920 x 1080 pixel
Epson HDTV LCD) in front of our PDLC-sensor setup
(Fig. 3). These three elements forms our ROSS key stor-
age device. Physically joining the SLM and film with a
half-ball lens (radius = 1 cm), and the film to the sensor
with a 1 cm quartz cylinder (Mcmaster-Carr 1357T62),
helps minimize movement. The SLM controllably varies
an “input” wavefront incident upon the scatterer, to se-
quentially detect many mutually random speckle inten-
sity pattern “outputs”. Considering our SLM and CMOS
array extend along one dimension for simplicity, we may
mathematically denote the ith pattern displayed on the
SLM as p(i) and the corresponding detected speckle im-
age as s(i). When illuminated with a plane wave, the ith
SLM input and detected speckle output are connected by,
s(i) = |Tp(i)|2, where T is the volume’s unique random
scattering matrix. T contains all the inherent random-
ness that imparts our detected keys with their security.
A sufficiently large set of many independent speckle mea-
surements s(i) ∈ S efficiently transfers all of T ’s stored
randomness to the digital detector. In practice, we probe
T with a set of mutually random binary SLM patterns
p(i) ∈ P to maximize photon throughput, and combine 2
separate layers of PDLC film into a thicker 1.5 mm stack
to ensure T is a fully random matrix.
Two issues prevent us from directly forming the set of
speckle images S into a collection of cryptographic keys.
First, the histogram of an ideal speckle pattern’s inten-
sity values is exponentially distributed [25], whereas a
key’s must be uniformly distributed. We resolve this issue
with digital whitening, which simply re-hashes detected
bits together (via modulo addition) until they approach
uniformity. We implement digital whitening by multiply-
ing the detected speckle images (represented as a binary
vector) with a large sparse binary matrix H [24]. This
technique is both computationally efficient and crypto-
graphically secure: H may be shared publicly without
any loss to security (see Supplementary text for details).
The second issue is the introduction of noise, which
can prevent our device from perfectly recreating an ini-
tial random key k(t = 0) at a later time t = tc. Absolute
removal of all noise is a pre-requisite for effective non-
digital key storage - a single flipped key bit will cause
almost any cryptographic algorithm to crash. Noise is
overcome by adopting a procedure called fuzzy commit-
ment, an information-theoretically secure method of re-
moving any flipped bits [26]. In short, fuzzy commitment
sacrifices a fixed number of key bits to selectively remove
any measurements that may have changed over time, us-
ing an error-correction algorithm. It consists of two steps:
a “creation” step performed once to generate a new key,
and a “recovery” step performed any subsequent time the
same key is accessed, as detailed below. Additional de-
tails about fuzzy commitment are in the Supplementary
text.
We experimentally test our ROSS device with fuzzy
commitment by first displaying n = 4300 random binary
SLM screen inputs p(i) to create and capture the same
number of uncorrelated 4.85 MB speckle images s(i). n
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FIG. 4. The fuzzy commitment protocol. (a) A key k and
witness w are created from the same whitened speckle image
s0, which are XOR’d together to create a secure, publicly
sharable blob b. (b) The key is recovered at any later time tc
by using the ROSS to re-create a noisy witness w, XORing
it with b and applying error correction to recover a noiseless
key k.
4SLM 
PDLC film 
Detector 
Reset 
Voltage SLM 
Controller 
FIG. 5. An example experimental ROSS device. The optical
source (not shown) illuminates the SLM from the left to form
different speckle patterns on the detector.
is selected to efficiently extract all the randomness con-
tained within our 1 mm3 PDLC scattering volume with-
out introducing unwanted correlations [21]. Each im-
age s(i) is transformed via the digital whitening matrix
H into a 2.42 MB vector. The same matrix H trans-
forms each image. We then implement key creation with
fuzzy commitment, as outlined in Fig. 4(a). First, each
whitened speckle sequence s(i) is split into two segments:
a 0.85 Mb key vector k comprising a set of concatenated
332 random 256-bit encryption keys, and a 19.3 Mb wit-
ness vector w. Second, the key k is encoded as a longer
19.3 Mb “codeword” k′ and XOR’d with the witness to
create an encrypted 19.3 Mb blob b, which we save dig-
itally. The encrypted blob b is information-theoretically
secure, and may be shared publicly without any sacrifice
to our system’s physical security.
At a later time tc = 24 hours, we attempt to access
our saved keys using fuzzy commitment key recovery, as
outlined in Fig. 4(b). First, we regenerate a noisy speckle
image s′(i). Second, we XOR s′(i) with the saved blob
b. Third, we apply a modified (255, 9) Hamming error
correction with an additional 12.5% data reduction factor
to the XOR result, which recovers the key vector k with
minimal error. k is subsequently split up into its 332
constituent secret keys for direct use. A single 256-bit key
may be accessed by simply applying the above treatment
to a cropped segment of one speckle image.
Executing key recovery with n = 4300 unique speckle
images at a later time tc=24 hours leads to a total of
1.43 million 256-bit keys, of which 90.2% are error-free.
During practical operation, erroneous keys must be dis-
carded and regenerated, which will delay the completion
of any associated protocol. An example ROSS device
is shown in Fig. 5. Fig.6(a) demonstrates our set of
256-bit ROSS keys are minimally correlated. A Gaus-
sian fit of the key set’s inter-key Hamming distance (i.e.,
key correlation) finds a mean of 0.50 and variance of
9.81 × 10−4. Comparing this variance to the predicted
variance of an independent, identically distribution bino-
mial process (9.77 × 10−4) suggests each key comprises
nearly 256 independent variables, as we expect. We ad-
ditionally verify our ROSS key set’s randomness by en-
suring an arbitrarily selected 24 MB sequence of 750,000
concatenated keys passes all tests contained within the
Diehard [27] and NIST [28] statistical random number
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FIG. 6. (a) Hamming distance between one key k(1) and
3 × 105 other keys from the same device follows an uncor-
related binary random process (BRP) curve. (b) Hamming
distance between one key k(i) and the corresponding key r(i),
creating using the same screen input p(i) but after PDLC re-
set, similarly demonstrates complete key decorrelation.
generator test suites. Example statistics from these tests
are in the Supplementary text.
To demonstrate key reconfigurability, we use one ROSS
device to generate 250 speckle images S using the same
SLM pattern set P at four separate times: t1-t4. At t1,
we execute key creation to form key vector k1 containing
8.4 x 104 individual 256-bit random keys. At t2, two
hours later, we perform key recovery to obtain 98% of
the keys in k1 error-free. We then apply 40 V DC for 1
second across the PDLC interface to reset its scattering
potential. At t3, one minute after reset, we again display
SLM pattern set P , but record a different set of speckle
images, S′. Attempting to use S′ for key recovery of k1
leads to the error histogram in Fig. 6(b). All random
bits have been completely reset to a new uncorrelated
configuration. However, we can use S′ to generate a new
set of 8.4 x 104 keys, which we again recover two hours
later at t4 with 98% accuracy. Our ROSS device thus
continues to offer “fresh” keys after each reset.
Currently, the primary shortcoming of our device is
the limited lifetime over which a sequence of keys may
be saved without error. The demonstrated 24 hour stor-
age lifetime may potentially extend to several days or
weeks, but decorrelation of the polymer film’s optical re-
sponse (due to temperature variation, movement, and
laser source fluctuations) has been repeatedly observed.
Material decorrelation also causes our high key error rate
and limits the device’s total number of saved keys by re-
quiring low bit rate error correction. Future efforts will
examine alternative optical setups that may better stabi-
lize the scattering material, alternative error correction
procedures that may help recover keys with higher bit
rates, and different PDLC densities and film thicknesses
with extended decorrelation half-lives.
To conclude, our reconfigurable optical PUF device is
capable of storing over one million 256-bit keys within a
physically disordered volumetric structure that is approx-
imately 1 cubic millimeter in size. Keys may be reset into
new, nearly perfectly uncorrelated sequences of random
bits with a one-second applied DC voltage. To the best
5of our knowledge, no other device offers such a physically
unclonable key storage medium that allows direct elec-
tronic reconfiguration. The potential density of stored
randomness (10 Gb/mm3) can offer many future cryp-
tographic applications the opportunity to use multiple,
large, time-varying keys to enhance security.
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